Mensajes : 696
Fecha de inscripción : 04/06/2010
|Tema: SEADs Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Sáb 16 Oct 2010 - 20:33|| |
SEAD = Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
Son misiones aéreas destinadas a destruir / anular / disminuir las Defensas Aéreas de Superficie del enemigo, sus radares, su artillería antiaérea y sus misiles Superficie – Aire (SAMs), todo ello preferentemente en las primeras horas de una Operación Aérea de gran envergadura o antes de cualquier ataque a un Objetivo Material de importancia.
Se habla de que la cuarta parte de los combates de los EEUU recientes han sido misiones SEAD
---------------------------------------Military Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD): Assessing Future Needs
- Citación :
- “Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as “That activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means.” 1
By this definition, many military platforms, munitions, and processes contribute to SEAD, including reconnaissance and surveillance, stand-off jamming, employment of air-tosurface munitions, and electronic and infrared (IR) countermeasures. 2
A variety of weapons platforms and munitions can and have been used to attack enemy air defenses, including long range bombers, helicopters, surface-to-surface missiles, precision guided munitions (PGMs), rockets, and “dumb bombs.”
However, some combat aircraft have been designed or modified to increase their effectiveness against enemy air defenses and are typically thought of as SEAD assets. These include the F-16, EA-6B, F/A-18 and F-15E. These aircraft carry a number of munitions useful against surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Some carry the AGM-88 High Speed Anti Radiation Missile (HARM) which is designed to lock-on to and destroy the ground-based radars used by some SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Also, the HARM Targeting System (HTS) and the Tactical Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System (TERPES), improve the ability of the F-16CJ and Marine Corps EA-6B Prowlers to target enemy air defense radars.
Suppressing enemy air defenses has always been an important means of protecting U.S. aircraft, and enabling effective air operations. However, SEAD may be of growing importance to DOD and Congress for at least three reasons.
[*] While combat aircraft have played an important role in most U.S. conflicts since World War I, the last several conflicts (Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Iraq 1996-present, and Afghanistan in 2001) have emphasized the use of military aviation, suggesting that defense planners are finding airpower an increasingly practicable military tool.
[*] There appear to be very few countries capable of seriously challenging U.S. air forces in air-to-air combat. Since Operation Desert Storm, 100 percent of all U.S. combat aircraft losses have been due to enemy air defenses. No U.S. aircraft has been lost to an enemy aircraft since 1991. Most countries will challenge U.S. airpower primarily with surface-based air defenses. 3
[*] DOD finds some air defenses difficult to suppress or destroy. Many analysts say that emerging air defense technologies and tactics will prove more threatening and more difficult to counter than current systems.
El EA-18 Growler
Issues of ConcernThe Pentagon frequently expresses concern over several interrelated developments in enemy air defenses: the emergence and proliferation of a new generation of Russian SAMs, and the application of new technologies, either in conjunction with these or with other air defense elements. Shoulder-fired missiles continue to pose a problem for today’s SEAD forces. Observers are also concerned about the effect of strict rules of engagement on SEAD effectiveness.
Russian SA-10 and SA-12 SAMs have been operational since the 1980s, but currently are in the inventory or possession of only a handful of countries (e.g., Russia, China, Cyprus, The Czech Republic, and Germany). 4 These “double digit” SAMs are a concern for military planners due to their mobility, long range, high altitude, advanced missile guidance, and sensitive radars. The Russian SA-20, still under development, has been likened to the U.S. Patriot PAC-2 missile, but with an even longer range and a radar capable of detecting stealthy aircraft. Military planners are concerned that a country with only a handful of these SAMs could effectively challenge U.S. military air operations by threatening aircraft and disrupting operations from great distances.
A variety of new technologies and military systems could exacerbate the “double digit” SAM challenge. First, commercial information and communications technologies are enabling adversaries to better network the elements of their air defense systems. This allows them to disperse radars, SAM launchers and other associated platforms throughout the battlespace, and to share targeting information between launchers. This, in turn, suggests that radars may be used less frequently and for shorter periods of time, complicating U.S. SEAD efforts. Second, terminal defenses are being marketed by a number of international defense companies. These radar-guided Gatling guns are designed to protect “double digit” SAMs or other high value air defense assets, by shooting 3,000 to 4,500 rounds per minute into the sky. These systems could prove quite effective in shooting down HARM or other missiles aimed at enemy air defenses. Third, Russia and other countries have developed and are selling GPS jammers. Over varying distances, these low-watt jammers degrade or totally disrupt the GPS guidance signals used by many U.S. PGMs to augment inertial guidance systems, reducing their accuracy.
U.S. military planners must also grapple with today’s pernicious air defense threats, such as shoulder-fired missiles. Unlike “double digit” SAMs, MANPADs (eg. the U.S. Stinger, Russian SA-7, and French Mistral) are widely proliferated, and found in the inventories of scores of countries. These missiles are difficult to suppress due to their small size, high mobility and IR guidance. Unlike radar guidance, IR guidance — which MANPADs tend to use — does not emit energy that U.S. self-defense systems can detect. Thus, the launch of an IR-guided missile often comes as a surprise to the targeted aircraft, reducing the time for evasive maneuvers or deployment of self protection countermeasures. This increases MANPADs effectiveness. IR guided SAMs were the primary source of air combat losses in Operation Desert Storm,5 and since 1973, nearly half of all air losses in combat have been attributed to IR-guided SAMs, many of them launched from MANPADs. Others estimate that MANPADs caused 90% of worldwide combat aircraft losses from 1984-2001. 6
Shoulder-fired missiles also pose a terrorist threat to civilian aircraft. RAND estimates that at least 20 and as many as 40 civilian airliners were shot down by terrorists using MANPADs between 1975 and 1992. 7 (CRS estimates six of these aircraft were actually airliners, the others were smaller than most commercial aircraft.) 8 The threat to civilian airliners posed by terrorists with shoulder-fired missiles appears to be an issue of increasing congressional concern. At least three bills introduced during the FY2005 budget cycle addressed methods for mitigating the threat of shoulder-fired missiles to commercial aviation. 9
Rules of engagement (ROE) are designed by military planners to reduce the likelihood of fratricide (shooting down friendly aircraft), to minimize unintended civilian casualties, and in some cases, for political feasibility (e.g., operating in ways palatable to coalition partners). Some have asserted that ROE in recent conflicts have been “draconian” and tied the hands of SEAD pilots; reducing their effectiveness. 10 DOD may seek congressional support for more lenient ROE in future wars.
Ver la nota completa en la fuente citada.
1 Joint Publication 1-02. DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. April 12, 2001.
2 For discussion of stand-off jamming and electronic warfare, see CRS Report RL30639
3 Historically, the percentage of U.S. combat losses due to aerial combat has steadily declined and the percentage of losses due to enemy air defenses has steadily risen. In World War II, U.S. air combat losses were split almost evenly between aerial combat (46%) and air defenses (54%).
By the Korean and Vietnam wars however, combat losses due to enemy air defenses had risen to approximately 90% and aerial combat losses had dropped to approximately 10 percent.
4 World Missiles Briefing. Teal Group, Inc. February 2001. India, Iran, Syria and Vietnam are known to have negotiated with Russia for these systems, but acquisition has not been confirmed in open source literature.
5 Steven Zaloga. The Evolving SAM Threat: Kosovo and Beyond. Journal of Electronic Defense. May 2000.
6 Michael Puttre. Facing the Shoulder-Fired Threat. Journal of Electronic Defense. April 2001.
7 Marvin B. Shaffer. Concerns about Terrorists with Manportable SAMs. RAND. Oct. 1993. p.3.
8 CRS Report RL31741, Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles.
9 Ibid. p 20.
10 Benjamin Lambeth. NATO’s Air War for Kosovo. (RAND, 2001) p.142.
11 Deliberate Force Case Study, op.cit. p. 315.
12 Rep. Randy “Duke” Cunningham, Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses: Improvements Needed. EW Working Group Issue Brief #7.
13 Gert Kromhout. “From SEAD to DEAD.” Military Technology. April 2001.
Última edición por Delfin el Dom 17 Oct 2010 - 8:14, editado 1 vez
Mensajes : 696
Fecha de inscripción : 04/06/2010
|Tema: Re: SEADs Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Sáb 16 Oct 2010 - 20:40|| |
"Suppression of Enemy Air Defense [SEAD] is that activity which neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades enemy air defense systems in a specific area to enable air operations to be successfully completed. SEAD is critical for all operations.
CAS, BAI, and attack operations in support of combat operations require SEAD fires against the many antiaircraft systems that accompany the threat's forward elements. Some of this SEAD is appropriate for nonlethal (EW) attack assets that jam air defense radar systems. A critical element in performing SEAD is locating enemy air defense weapons and facilities.
Electronic warfare support measures and other target acquisition sources are used for this purpose. Airspace coordination areas and phase lines may be used to coordinate a SEAD effort."
The air control role accomplished by attack air forces includes Suppression of Enemy Air Defense [SEAD] and offensive counterair [OCA] missions.
Imagen: Misil Kh-31 Antiradar / Anti AWACS
Mensajes : 223
Fecha de inscripción : 30/05/2010
Edad : 29
Localización : SF - Arg
|Tema: Re: SEADs Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Lun 18 Oct 2010 - 19:37|| |
Buen artículo, aunque creo que debería ir en otra sección, no es sobre la FAA... En caso de hablar de la FAA, creo que el SEAD debería realizarse, en cierta medida, con A-4AR. Obviamente no se contaría con misiles antiradar, pero se podría tener una buena fuerza latente con LGB FAS-850 Dardo II, más un misil AS, como podría ser el AGM-65 o el supuesto Dardo III.
|Tema: Re: SEADs Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Lun 18 Oct 2010 - 22:32|| |
- Eagle_Giuli escribió:
- En caso de hablar de la FAA, creo que el SEAD debería realizarse, en cierta medida, con A-4AR. Obviamente no se contaría con misiles antiradar, pero se podría tener una buena fuerza latente con LGB FAS-850 Dardo II, más un misil AS, como podría ser el AGM-65 o el supuesto Dardo III.
Eagle. Podría tantearse a Brasil por el MAR-1.
|Tema: Re: SEADs Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Hoy a las 3:21|| |